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Making Live and Letting Die: The Biopolitical Effect of 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service 
Jessica M. Erickson† 
The being within, communing with past ages, tells me that once, nor 
until lately, there was no white man on this continent; that it then all 
belonged to red men, children of the same parents, placed on it by 
the Great Spirit that made them, to keep it, to traverse it, to enjoy its 
productions, and to fill it with the same race, once a happy race, 
since made miserable by the white people who are never contented 
but always encroaching.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The philosophies of Michel Foucault have long been applied to var-
ious cultures and social movements in hopes of gaining insight into how 
power operates within a societal framework.2  One philosophy, Fou-
cault’s conception of “biopolitics,” refers to the state’s regulatory control 
over the population as a whole, or its ability to control the life and death 
of the citizenry.3  Instead of exercising power at the level of each indi-
vidual, “biopower”4 is exercised on the level of the population; it is the 
power to make live and let die.5 
                                                 
† J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seattle University School of Law; B.A., Philosophy and Religious Studies, 
B.A., Law and Justice, Central Washington University, 2003.  The author would like to thank the 
members of the Seattle University Law Review, especially Gabriella Wagner, James Beebe, Micol 
Sirkin, and Colin Prince.  The author would also like to thank her family for their constant and un-
ending support. 
 1. See JOHN SUGDEN, TECUMSEH: A LIFE 22, 374–75 (1997).  Tecumseh (born in March 1768 
and died on October 5, 1813) was a famous Native American leader of the Shawnee. 
 2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE 
FRANCE 1975–1976, (Mauro Bertani et al. eds., David Macey trans., 2003) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, 
SMBD]. 
 3. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 139, 143 (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY]; see also FOUCAULT, 
SMBD, supra note 2, at 243. 
 4. The terms “biopolitics” and “biopower” are used somewhat interchangeably within Fou-
cault’s philosophies, but basically, biopolitics is the style of government that regulates populations 
through biopower—the impact of political power on all aspects of human life. 
 5. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 241. 
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Indian6 nations have been battling for sovereignty—freedom from 
external control in determining the direction of their life—since the 
founding of this country.7  Throughout its relatively short history, the 
United States has espoused a number of varying policies directed to-
wards Native Americans and tribal culture.8  These policies, manifested 
through various congressional acts and case law, have had differing im-
pacts on native culture. 
One noteworthy example is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA),9 which despite its noble purpose,10 has proven to have a nega-
tive effect on tribal culture.  The Ninth Circuit has erected hurdles that 
tribes must face in order to establish a valid claim under the RFRA.  Be-
ginning with its ruling in Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service,11 the 
Ninth Circuit has consistently denied tribes’ claims under the RFRA be-
cause evidence of “damaged spiritual feelings” is insufficient to prove 
that practice of their religion was substantially burdened.12 
This Note explores the connection between the philosophy of Mi-
chel Foucault and current Ninth Circuit sacred site cases, primarily Na-
vajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service.13  Part II of this Note discusses Fou-
cault’s philosophies on biopower.  Part III briefly explores the evolution 
of federal Indian policy.  Part IV provides background on Native Ameri-
can religions and their connection to the land.  Part V outlines the Ninth 
Circuit’s legal framework for protecting native religions.  Part VI con-
cludes the Note, arguing that the test developed from Navajo Nation 
should be reconsidered because of its biopolitical effect on Native Amer-
ican populations.  In its place, a new test should be implemented that 
takes into consideration the unique character of the link between native 
religion and the land. 
                                                 
 6. This Note uses the terms “Native American,” “Indian,” and “native” interchangeably as each 
term is considered to be politically acceptable. 
 7. An indepth analysis of what sovereignty means in the context of federal Indian law is 
beyond the scope of this Note.  It is sufficient to observe that Indian policy and the definition of 
tribal sovereignty has fluctuated through the years.  See infra, Part II. 
 8. For an overview of Federal Indian law, see FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW, (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Lexis Nexis 2005) (1953). 
 9. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107 Stat. 
1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006)). 
 10. One declared purpose is to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise 
is substantially burdened by the government.”  Id. 
 11. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2763 (2009). 
 12. Id. at 1070 n.12. 
 13. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d 1058. 
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II.  FOUCAULT AND POWER 
Just as the history of Indian policy is relevant to understand how 
tribal sovereignty and land ownership has evolved, background on Fou-
cault’s theories of power is necessary to understand how this power is 
experienced in the Native American context.  Because of the strong link 
between Native American culture and the land, regulations affecting the 
land inevitably affect the native populations themselves.  Foucault’s 
theories provide a framework from which we can criticize regulation14 
affecting Native American sacred sites.  Moreover, the nature of Fou-
cauldian power explains how entire populations can be affected, or even 
eliminated, by certain types of legal or political decisions. 
Michel Foucault, noted philosopher, historian, critic, and sociolo-
gist, is widely known for his work on power and the relationships be-
tween power, knowledge, and discourse.  Foucault taught at the Collège 
de France from January 1971 until his death in June 1984.15  In a series 
of lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 1975 and 1976, Foucault 
addressed the function of racism in the state and the specific techniques 
of power associated with it.  In his concluding lecture, he considered two 
different powers he had undertaken to study in the course. 
The first was the power of the sovereign: from the early modern pe-
riod, the power embodied by the sovereign was a “right of life and death” 
over his subjects—the right to “take life or let live.”16  The seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries saw the emergence of techniques of power that 
were centered on the individual body, such as torture and the modern 
penal system.17  However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, a 
new technology of power emerged, which modified the disciplinary 
power and expanded it beyond the realm of the individual.18  As Foucault 
explained, “[u]nlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new 
nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living 
man, to man-as-living-being. . . .  [T]o man-as-species.”19  This man-as-
species power did not, like discipline, try to control by ruling a “multip-
licity of men to the extent that their multiplicity can and must be dis-
solved into individual bodies that can be kept under surveillance, trained, 
                                                 
 14. The term “regulation” is used loosely to describe any legislative act, administrative regula-
tion, or case law. 
 15. With the exception of 1977 (when he was on sabbatical).  His chair was in the History of 
Systems of Thought.  FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at ix. 
 16. Id. at 241. 
 17. See id. at 242.  This focus on the individual is most closely associated with Foucault’s work 
with disciplinary power and the emergence of modern penitentiaries.  See generally MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). 
 18. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 242. 
 19. Id. 
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used, and, if need be, punished.”20  Rather, this new power is established 
to address a multiplicity of men “not to the extent that they are nothing 
more than their individual bodies, but to the extent that they form, on the 
contrary, a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic 
of birth, death, production, illness, and so on.”21  It is this “massifying” 
and not “individualizing” power which Foucault called the “biopolitics 
of the human race.”22 
While disciplinary power is applied on an individual level to train 
and make use of the body, the second kind of power functions on a dif-
ferent scale and is implemented in a very different way.23  This power, 
called biopower, is applied to the human species through a biopolitical 
form of government.24  According to Foucault, biopower emerged during 
the eighteenth century as a result of the rapid growth of various discip-
lines and regulations designed to control burgeoning populations.25  Such 
power reduced life into a series of exacting calculations by the state and 
assigned knowledge as the power to transform human life.26  The subject 
of the state’s calculations increasingly became the life and death of the 
population as a whole, as opposed to specific individuals.27 
It is this slow evolution away from using political power to control 
the individual, to “take life or let live,” and towards the impact of politi-
cal power on all aspects of human life that Foucault describes as the 
“right to make live and to let die.”28  Another way to view this is to look 
at it as the contrast between an epidemic and an endemic.  Instead of an 
epidemic, which suddenly causes more frequent deaths, an endemic has 
permanent characteristics and factors that often work over time, that is, 
“illness as phenomena affecting a population.”29 
                                                 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 243. 
 22. Id.  Biopolitics referred to the state’s regulatory control over the population as a whole—
“the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biolog-
ical process.”  See FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 139; see also 
FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 243, 247 (With “the emergence . . . of this technology of power 
of ‘the’ population as such, over men insofar as they are living beings . . . we have the emergence of 
a power that [Foucault called] the power of regularization.”). 
 23. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 242. 
 24. Id.  Foucault also refers to this type of power as biopower in The History of Sexuality.  
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 143 (“applied not to man-as-body [as 
disciplinary power is], but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately . . . to man-as-
species.”). 
 25. See Joshua E. Perry, Biopolitics at the Bedside, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 171, 174 (2007). 
 26. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3. 
 27. Id. at 140. 
 28. FOUCAULT, SMBD, supra note 2, at 241. 
 29. Id. at 244. 
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While biopolitics most obviously concerns population-level health 
regulation and policy, it also encompasses environmental regulation.  
Foucault explained that control over the human species is also exercised 
by control over its environment, the “milieu in which they live.”30  This 
includes direct effects on geographical, climatic, or hydrographic envi-
ronment, including “the problem of the environment to the extent that it 
is not a natural environment.”31  Basically, when you control a popula-
tion’s environment, you control the population. 
Foucault’s philosophy on biopower has primarily been connected to 
scholarship in the medical field and the field of health regulation.32  
However, any time a regulation, a court ruling, or even a social norm 
affects the ability to live, Foucault’s ideas apply.  The exercise of bio-
power to “compel conformity and its tendency to oppress and alienate 
results in political struggles and strategies that manifest in culture wars 
over one’s ‘right’ to life (and to death), to health, to happiness, to one’s 
body, and ‘to rediscovery of what one is and all that one can be.’”33  This 
right to rediscover oneself and determine specific opinions and 
worldviews includes religion.  Therefore, within the Native American 
context, regulation of the land, manifested through judicial holding, has a 
biopolitical effect on life because individual and tribal identity are inse-
parably connected with what is being regulated—the land. 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 
Federal Indian policy has a long and varied history in the United 
States.34  Occasionally, sentiments focus on tribes as inherent sovereign 
bodies associated with a particular geographical base protected by the 
federal government.35  However, the dominant policy has been to com-
pletely disseminate tribes and assimilate their members into non-Indian 
society.36  The tension between these disparate views is still felt in cur-
rent Indian law cases.  For this reason, it is unsafe to presume that federal 
Indian policy has settled in one particular direction.37 
                                                 
 30. Id. at 245. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 25. 
 33. Id. at 175 (citing FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 3, at 145). 
 34. See generally COHEN, supra note 8, for a comprehensive overview of federal Indian policy. 
 35. See the Marshall Trilogy: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 36. The aim of the termination policy was, “as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within 
the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges 
and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, [and] to end their status as 
wards of the United States . . . .”  H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953). 
 37. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 8, at 10. 
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During early colonial times, tribes were viewed as sovereign pow-
ers.38  However, as the colonies continued to expand and the American 
Revolution came and went, tension grew between Indian and non-Indian 
populations, particularly with regard to the land the tribes occupied.39  A 
series of cases, known as the “Marshall Trilogy,”40 quickly emerged and 
defined tribal sovereignty in relation to land. 
The first of the trilogy, Johnson v. M’Intosh,41 recognized that al-
though the tribes had the right to occupy their land, the federal govern-
ment could extinguish any title they held.  Additionally, the tribes could 
alienate their land only to the federal government.42  In effect, the Court 
determined that the title the Indians held (“Indian title” or “aboriginal 
title”) was held only at the sufferance of the federal government,43 and 
that, by purchase or conquest, this title could be taken away.44 
Following M’Intosh, the Court further tailored the concept of tribal 
sovereignty in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.45  Chief Justice Marshall 
determined that the tribes were capable of governing themselves and 
their own affairs; however, their sovereignty was not comparable to that 
of a foreign nation.46  Rather, Marshall said that their status was that of a 
“domestic dependant nation,” which was enclosed entirely within the 
United States territory.47  The dependent nation’s relationship with the 
United States is like that of a ward to its guardian.48  This is the root of 
the “trust responsibility,” a term describing the relationship between the 
federal and tribal governments.49 
Even more pivotal than Cherokee Nation in affirming tribal sove-
reignty was Worcester v. Georgia.50  After reviewing treaties made with 
the Cherokee, congressional acts, and the course of dealing with the In-
dians, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the Cherokee nation was a 
distinct community “occupying its own territory, with boundaries accu-
rately described.”51  Marshall further asserted that the state’s law could 
                                                 
 38. See id. at 10–19.  With sovereignty came the right to deal with foreign nations, such as the 
British Colonies, and the recognition that Indian tribes held some kind of alienable title to the land 
they occupied.  Id. 
 39. It is beyond the scope of this Note to address the detailed history of each period. 
 40. See cases cited supra note 35. 
 41. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 42. See id. at 573. 
 43. See id.; COHEN, supra note 8, at 56. 
 44. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587. 
 45. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 46. Id. at 16. 
 47. Id. at 17. 
 48. Id. 
 49. COHEN, supra note 8, at 122. 
 50. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 51. Id. at 520. 
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have no force in that territory, reaffirming tribal sovereignty over the 
tribe’s own land.52  However, as the West continued to expand and 
change, federal Indian policy was forced to change with it. 
The expanding West caused federal Indian policy to evolve—by re-
stricting tribes to specific reservations.53  As demand for Indian land in-
creased, justification for acquiring non-Indian lands became necessary.54  
The theory of assimilation was used to justify the legislation approving 
the acquisition of Indian lands and was heralded as benefitting the In-
dians.55  Some proponents of assimilation believed that the policy would 
aid the absorption of Indian tribes into mainstream society and thereby 
cure “savage” tribes of their culture.56 
The Indians’ move to the reservations57 was followed shortly by the 
Allotment Era.  During this period, reservations were broken into smaller 
portions and given to individual Indians.58,59  The allotment period con-
tinued until the beginning of the twentieth century, when policy shifted 
more towards tolerance and respect for the traditional aspects of Indian 
culture.60  However, this period of reorganization61 was short-lived.  The 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 561. 
 53. COHEN, supra note 8, at 45, 65.  Policy shifted from removing the tribes to concentrating 
them on fixed reservations.  Id.  The policy of “concentrating the Indians on small reservations of 
land, and of sustaining them there for a limiting period, until they can be induced to make necessary 
exertions to support themselves” was first implemented in 1853.  Id.; CHARLES E. MIX, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-1, at 357 (1858). 
 54. COHEN, supra note 8, at 45. 
 55. Id. at 77. 
 56. See id.; Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 57. The federal government reserved distinct portions of land on which they would provide 
“only sufficient land for their actual occupancy . . . divid[ed] among them in severalty . . . and in lieu 
of money annuities . . . stock animals, agricultural implements, mechanic shops, tools and materials, 
and manual labor schools for the industrial and mental education of their youth.”  COHEN, supra note 
8, at 65 (quoting S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 35-1, at 357).  Reservations were, in effect, “schools for civili-
zation” provided to further the goal of assimilation.  COHEN, supra note 8, at 65. 
 58. See generally Indian General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (re-
pealed 1934); COHEN, supra note 8, at 75–84.  Allotment decreased tribal landholding and surplus 
land was often sold to non-Indians.  Id. 
 59. It should be noted that allotment did not always have its intended effect.  Indians were not 
“transformed into farmers” and the complex scheme of issuing fee patents enabled some Indians to 
sell their land but left many Indians landless.  COHEN, supra note 8, at 78. 
 60. COHEN, supra note 8, at 84.  The primary catalyst for change was the well-known Meriam 
Report.  Id.; INST. FOR GOV’T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Me-
riam ed., 1928).  This two-year non-governmental study brought public attention to the deplorable 
living conditions of tribal peoples.  COHEN, supra note 8, at 84.  Although the Report reflected some 
assimilationist attitudes, it gave greater credence to Indian culture and aimed to develop that which is 
good in Indian culture “rather than to crush out all that is Indian.”  Id.; see also COMMITTEE OF ONE 
HUNDRED, THE INDIAN PROBLEM, H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 68-149 (1924). 
 61. See generally Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–479 (2006)). 
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United States soon found itself in the middle of the Great Depression, 
followed closely by World War II.62 
Shortly after World War II, federal Indian policy made a dramatic 
shift towards “termination.”  This affected the tribes in two ways.63  First, 
termination functioned as an experiment imposed on a small number of 
tribes and ended the special relationship64 between those tribes and the 
federal government.65  Second, tribes that were not directly terminated 
suffered as large amounts of acreage were passed out of Indian hands, 
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs was stripped of many of its responsibili-
ties.66 
Beginning in 1958, federal Indian policy shifted once again, this 
time to promote self-determination and tribal self-governance.67  The 
effect of self-determination can be seen in the passage of the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968,68 which extends federal constitutional protections to 
tribal governments.69  Further, the theme of protecting and extending tri-
bal life can be clearly seen in the vast array of policies, programs, and 
legislation that have recently taken shape.70  Encapsulating the spirit of 
affirming tribal culture, President Clinton pledged that “our first prin-
ciple must be to respect your right to remain who you are and to live the 
way you wish.”71 
One important component of federal Indian law, as opposed to pol-
icy, is the emergence of specific canons of construction.72  The canons’ 
main requirement is that treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive or-
ders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians, with any ambiguity 
resolved in their favor.73  These canons are grounded in the values of 
structural sovereignty, not “judicial solicitude for powerless minori-
ties.”74  Because these canons help mediate problems that are presented 
by the nonconsensual inclusion of Indian nations into the United States, 
                                                 
 62. See COHEN, supra note 8, at 89. 
 63. Id. at 89–97. 
 64. This special relationship refers to the federal trust responsibility.  See Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (recognizing the existence of the federal trust responsibility). 
 65. COHEN, supra note 8, at 91. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 97–113. 
 68. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). 
 69. Prior to the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, constitutional restrictions, including the 
Bill of Rights, did not apply to tribes.  See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
 70. COHEN, supra note 8, at 104–05. 
 71. Id. at 105. 
 72. Id. at 119. 
 73. Id.; see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); City 
of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 74. COHEN, supra note 8, at 123; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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they are helpful in preserving distinct Native American cultures as well 
as the tribes’ inherent sovereignty. 
IV.  RELIGION AND PEOPLEHOOD 
The unique character of Native American culture is inextricably 
linked to religion.75  As Vine Deloria said, “There is no salvation in tribal 
religions apart from the continuance of the tribe itself.”76  The conti-
nuance of the tribe depends not only on legal recognition of a tribe’s so-
vereign status,77 but also on continuing access to sites deemed sacred by 
the native communities for spiritual activities.78  This Part establishes the 
direct link between Native Americans, religion, and the land.  It de-
scribes how a law or regulation disturbing the use of sacred land can 
have the effect of destroying the religion, the culture, and ultimately the 
people who use the land for religious purposes. 
The survival of a population often depends on religious and cultural 
unity within that population.  One way of describing such unity of a tri-
bal population is to look at it as “peoplehood,” a concept recently ad-
vanced by Kristen Carpenter.79  As Carpenter explains, peoplehood is 
“an inclusionary and involuntary group identity with a putatively shared 
history and distinct way of life.”80  In addition, “[p]eoplehood is a shared 
consciousness and commitment to a group characterized by ‘common 
descent—a shared genealogy or geography’ as well as ‘contemporary 
commonality, such as language, religion, culture, or consciousness.’”81  
Peoplehood has less to do with being generally Indian; rather, it is tribal-
specific, relating to particular locations and customs.82  This is contrary 
to how most people think about Native Americans; people often fail to 
                                                 
 75. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 
352 (2008). 
 76. VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED: A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 194 (1992). 
 77. Tribal sovereignty is a complex question of Indian law.  See generally COHEN, supra note 
8.  However, for the purposes of this Note, I recognize that biopolitical effect on a tribal group is not 
dependent on legal recognition of that tribe. 
 78. DELORIA, supra note 76. 
The Hopi believe that pleasing the Katsinam on the [San Francisco] Peaks is crucial to 
their livelihood.  Appearing in the form of clouds, the Katsinam are responsible for bring-
ing rain to the Hopi villages from the Peaks.  The Katsinam must be treated with respect, 
lest they refuse to bring the rains from the Peaks to nourish the corn crop. 
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 79. Carpenter, supra note 75. 
 80. Id. at 348. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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differentiate between the spiritual experiences and belief systems of in-
dividual tribal groups.83 
Carpenter explains that each tribe often maintains its own religion, 
culture, and language, even though similarities may be found with other 
tribes.84  Although these traits change over time, tribes can often trace 
current religious and cultural practices back to pre-contact times.85  As an 
illustration of how historically rich Indian identity is, as well as its deep 
connection with the land base, S. James Anaya offers the following spe-
cialized definition of “indigenous peoples”:86 
They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in 
the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more deep-
ly than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the 
same lands or in close proximity.  Furthermore, they are peoples to 
the extent they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of 
existence and identity that links them to the communities, tribes, or 
nations of their ancestral past.87 
According to American Indian Studies scholar Tom Holm, there are 
four attributes of peoplehood that have helped to ensure the survival of 
Indian tribes throughout the devastating eras of conquest, colonization 
and forced assimilation.88  They are: (1) maintaining language; (2) under-
standing place; (3) keeping particular religious ceremonies alive; and (4) 
perpetuating a sacred history.89  These categories are interrelated; they 
reinforce the idea that sacred sites and American Indian peoplehood are 
strongly connected.90  For example, because keeping particular religious 
ceremonies alive often means performing them in a particular place, na-
tive culture and identity is reinforced when sacred places and observance 
of religion meet. 
Although the belief systems of individual tribal groups may differ, 
Native American belief systems as a whole are clearly distinct from the 
                                                 
 83. Martin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the “Free” Exercise of Religion, in NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND THE LAW: NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 19, 65 (John 
R. Wunder ed., 1996).  Because Native Americans are seen as distinct from Europeans, they are 
often grouped together in one unit.  However, native religions are as complex and diverse as the 
“multiplicity of their cultures suggest.”  This plurality is one hurdle that Native Americans face in 
the court system. 
 84. Id. at 56. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 350. 
 89. Id. (quoting TOM HOLM, THE GREAT CONFUSION IN INDIAN AFFAIRS: NATIVE AMERICANS 
& WHITES IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, at xiv, xvii (2005)). 
 90. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 351. 
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Western-based religions that permeate American culture.91  One of the 
primary differences between the Judeo-Christian tradition and native re-
ligions is that Native American spiritual traditions tend to be more spa-
tially oriented, while Judeo-Christian religions are more time-oriented.92  
This is not to say that there are no sacred sites within Judeo-Christian 
traditions, but rather that there is a stronger focus on specific events in 
the course of linear history than on a particular connection to place.  For 
Native Americans, however, the religious experience is often inseparable 
from a particular location.93 
This sacredness of place captures the true character of Native 
American life.94  As some Indians have described the connections to sa-
cred sites: “[O]ur ancestors arose from the earth here; . . . we make pil-
grimages and vision quests here; our gods dwell here; our religion re-
quires that we have privacy here; . . . hence, this sacred site must remain 
undisturbed, or we must have unlimited access to this place.”95  In short, 
for Native Americans, sacred places are “essential for human survival.”96 
Because these sites are essential for human survival, regulations 
damaging sites or prohibiting entry seriously affect the lives of both in-
dividual Indians and entire tribes.  This effect is biopolitical because the 
regulation essentially “lets die” the population affected—the native 
population.   
The importance of place is readily apparent when one dismisses any 
preconceived notion that may come from a Western religious mindset 
and develops a correct understanding of Native American religions.  Un-
like Western-based religious identities that may be formed by attending a 
variety of places of worship in different locations, Native-based religions 
cannot survive apart from the specific places to which they are con-
                                                 
 91. Although there are many religions observed in the United States, I will focus on the Judeo-
Christian influence and its contrast with native religion. 
 92. See Loesch, supra note 83, at 67; see also DELORIA, supra note 76, at 76.  Another major 
difference between Judeo-Christian religions and native religions is language.  “Because the domi-
nant society has not accepted native spirituality on its own terms, all Indian traditions and beliefs 
must be translated, in order for their petition to be heard in the American judicial system.”  Loesch, 
supra note 83, at 66.  Other differences include the lack of uniformity among native religions (as 
opposed to the sense of orthodoxy in many Western religions) and the mystery surrounding many 
native spiritual practices because they are generally conducted privately in remote places.  Id. at 67. 
 93. DELORIA, supra note 76, at 80 (“[r]evelation [is] a particular experience at a particular 
place, [with] no universal truth emerging”). 
 94. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70.  For a summary of core features of traditional Native Ameri-
can spirituality, see Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 102 (Christopher T. Vescey ed., 1991) 
[hereinafter AIRF HANDBOOK]. 
 95. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70 (quoting Christopher T. Vescey, Prologue, in AIRF 
HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 12). 
 96. Loesch, supra note 83, at 70 (quoting AIRF HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 25). 
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nected.  Because faith is always a part of identity, faith inextricably con-
nected with a particular location means that location is also part of one’s 
identity.  Thus, laws and regulations affecting that location also affect 
one’s identity, even to the point of extinguishing identity completely.  
V.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The case law dealing with religious freedoms is incredibly varied 
and highly complex.  Tensions between constitutional principles, such as 
the freedom of religion and the Establishment Clause,97 are strong, and 
conflicts are not easily resolved.  Recently, how Indian religious free-
doms are viewed and protected under the Constitution has begun to 
change.  Specifically, courts have struggled with defining what conduct 
constitutes a “substantial burden” on religion and determining the point 
at which qualifying conduct must be stopped.  The precedent that has 
emerged thus far has had a biopolitical effect on Native American popu-
lations.  By allowing sacred sites to be polluted, the native religious ex-
perience is tainted, if not altogether halted.  And, because native identity 
is inextricably connected with religious experience, damage to the native 
religious experience is harmful to collective native identity.  Therefore, 
new precedent should be developed that takes into account the unique 
character of native identity and its link to religion and the land. 
This Part first lays the foundation of general federal case law, both 
prior to and following the enactment of the RFRA.  It then explores the 
development of Ninth Circuit precedent, culminating in the creation of 
the Navajo Nation test. 
A.  General Federal Precedent 
1.  The Pre-RFRA Era 
Prior to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court established that the First 
Amendment prevents infringement on the exercise of religious beliefs 
unless such infringement is justified by a compelling interest that cannot 
be achieved through less restrictive means.98  In a 1963 decision, Sher-
bert v. Verner, the Court first applied a strict scrutiny test, requiring the 
government to demonstrate a compelling interest in Free Exercise Clause 
cases.99  Appellant Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Ad-
ventist Church, was fired from her job for refusing to work on Satur-
                                                 
 97. It is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss either First Amendment or Establishment 
Clause issues. 
 98. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 99. Id. 
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days.100  Sherbert subsequently applied for unemployment benefits, but 
her request was denied.101  Sherbert brought an action against her em-
ployer under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.102  In 
finding for the plaintiff, the Court held that “South Carolina may not 
constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a work-
er to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.”103 
Sherbert’s strict scrutiny test uses four criteria to determine whether 
an individual’s right to free exercise of religion has been violated.  A 
court must first determine whether the claim involves a sincere religious 
belief.104  Next, a court must determine whether the government action 
imposes a substantial burden on the free exercise of the individual’s reli-
gion.105  If the claimant shows a sincere religious belief upon which a 
government action imposes a substantial burden, the burden of proof 
shifts to the government.106  The government must then prove that it is 
acting in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and that it has 
pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive to religion.107 
The Court reaffirmed the Sherbert test in the 1972 case Wisconsin 
v. Yoder.108  In Yoder, three Amish families challenged a law requiring 
compulsory school attendance until the age of sixteen.109  Appellants ar-
gued that the law violated their religious belief that formal education 
should not be required past the eighth grade.110  By applying the Sherbert 
                                                 
 100. Id. at 399.  Seventh-Day Adventists believe “[t]he fourth commandment of God’s un-
changeable law requires the observance of this seventh-day Sabbath as the day of rest, worship, and 
ministry . . . .”  Seventh-Day Adventist Church, Fundamental Beliefs, http://www.adventist.org 
/beliefs/fundamental/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  For Seventh-Day Adventists, Saturdays 
are observed as the Sabbath. 
 101. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 410. 
 104. In Sherbert, the sincerity of appellant’s religious beliefs was not in dispute.  Id. at 399 n.1. 
 105. There was clearly a burden imposed in Sherbert.  The appellant was 
force[d] . . . to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting bene-
fits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to ac-
cept work, on the other hand.  Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same 
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appel-
lant for her Saturday worship. 
Id. at 404. 
 106. Id. at 406–09; Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 107. South Carolina did not meet its burden, and the Court declared the action unconstitutional.  
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–10. 
 108. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 109. Id. at 207. 
 110. The Court explained that 
[the petitioners] object to the high school, and higher education generally, because the 
values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; 
they view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a 
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test, the Court determined that the Wisconsin law violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause of the First Amendment because the State did not meet its 
burden of showing with more particularity how its admittedly strong in-
terest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting 
an exemption to the Amish.111 
The Sherbert test was sharply curtailed in Employment Division v. 
Smith, when the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment does not prohibit burdens on religious practices if they are 
imposed by laws of general applicability.112  The Court sidestepped 
Sherbert and Yoder by characterizing such cases as “hybrid” decisions 
invoking multiple constitutional interests and held that facially neutral 
laws would no longer be subject to strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.113 
In direct response to Smith, Congress quickly enacted the RFRA.114  
Congress opined that the Smith decision “virtually eliminated the re-
quirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise im-
posed by laws neutral toward religion,” and that “the compelling interest 
test as set forth in prior federal court rulings is a workable test for strik-
ing sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior go-
vernmental interests.”115  Congress declared the purposes of the RFRA 
are to “provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is 
substantially burdened by the government” and to “restore the compel-
ling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yo-
der.”116  The RFRA was quickly passed unanimously in the House of 
Representatives and gained all but three votes in the Senate.117 
                                                                                                             
‘worldly’ influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize in-
tellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly suc-
cess, and social life with other students. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-
through-doing; a life of ‘goodness,’ rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than 
technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, 
rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210–11. 
 111. Id. at 234–36. 
 112. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The respondents 
in Smith were members of the Native American Church and were fired for using peyote during a 
religious ceremony, which was prohibited under Oregon law.  The respondents were subsequently 
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.  Id. 
 113. Id. at 881–82. 
 114. Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 437 (1994). 
 115. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 2(b), 107 
Stat. 1488, 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2006)). 
 116. Id. § 2(b), 107 Stat. at 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)). 
 117. Eisgruber, supra note 114, at 438. 
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As it currently stands, the RFRA prohibits the federal govern-
ment118 from substantially burdening “a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b).”119  Subsection (b) states: “[the] Government 
may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demon-
strates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of 
a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”120  However, as with 
most congressional acts, determining the language of the Act is only the 
beginning.  The years following the enactment of RFRA saw much dis-
pute over what it means to substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion. 
2.  The Post-RFRA Era 
By enacting the RFRA, Congress restored the compelling interest 
standard and pre-Smith case law.  However, the force of the standard was 
soon limited by restraints on its applicability.  In Lyng v. Northwest In-
dian Cemetery Protective Association,121 a case concerning a Native 
American sacred site, the Court determined that only governmental ac-
tion that placed a substantial burden on religious exercise had to meet the 
compelling interest standard.122  Lyng concerned a proposal by the Unit-
ed States Forest Service to build a six-mile stretch of paved road through 
the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest.123  In prepa-
ration for an environmental impact statement, the Forest Service com-
missioned a study, which determined that the area had historically been 
used by certain American Indians for religious rituals that rely upon pri-
vacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.124  The commissioned 
study also determined that “the entire area is significant as an integral 
and indispensible part of Indian religious conceptualization and prac-
tice.”125  The study recommended that the road not be completed because 
                                                 
 118. In the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional 
as applied to state and local governments because it exceeded Congress’s authority under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  521 U.S. 507, 529, 534–35 (1997) (finding that RFRA basically 
changes the substantive meaning of the Establishment Clause and holding that Section 5 grants 
remedial powers only).  However, the Court did not invalidate RFRA as applied to the federal gov-
ernment.  See Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2002).  For purposes of this 
Note, it is pertinent only that RFRA applies to federal causes of action. 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006). 
 120. Id. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 121. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 442–52. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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constructing a road along any of the available routes “would cause se-
rious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral 
and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest Cali-
fornia Indian peoples.”126  However, the Forest Service declined to adopt 
the recommendation.127  Instead, it selected a route that avoided archeo-
logical sites and was far removed from the sites used by contemporary 
Indians for spiritual activities, but that still traversed land having ritualis-
tic value.128 
After exhausting their administrative remedies, several individual 
Native Americans, various organizations, and the State of California 
challenged both the road-building and timber-harvesting decisions in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, claiming that 
the Forest Service’s decision violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise 
Clause.129  In response, the district court issued a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the government from constructing the Chimney Rock road or 
putting the timber-harvesting management plan into effect.130  On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, concluding that the government had 
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the construction of the 
road.131  The Supreme Court subsequently reversed.132  Although the 
Court acknowledged that the Native Americans’ beliefs were sincere and 
that the government’s proposed actions would have severe adverse ef-
fects on the practice of their religion, the Court disagreed that the burden 
on their religious practices was “heavy enough” to violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause.133  The Court stated that precedent has not held “that inci-
dental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult 
to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce indi-
viduals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government 
to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful ac-
tions.”134 
The Court also opined that regardless of the nature of the rights af-
forded to the Indians, it shall “not divest the Government of its right to 
use what is, after all, its land.”135  Although the Court emphasized that 
                                                 
 126. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 127. Id. at 443. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; see also Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (1983). 
 131. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988). 
 132. Id. at 458. 
 133. Id. at 447. 
 134. Id. at 450–51. 
 135. Id. at 453.  Limiting the federal government’s use of its own land to avoid disrupting 
religious ceremonies might violate the Establishment Clause by imposing a “religious servitude” on 
the property and subsidizing the religion in question.  Id. 
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nothing in the opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensi-
tivity to the religious needs of any citizen, it went on to state, “[h]owever 
much we might wish it were otherwise, government simply could not 
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and 
desires.”136  Here, the Court’s inability to recognize the difference be-
tween cultural identity and personal autonomy is problematic and high-
lights the need for a correct understanding of collective tribal identity. 
B.  Ninth Circuit Precedent 
As discussed in Part IV, Native American religions are inextricably 
connected with the land, unlike many Western religions.  The San Fran-
cisco Peaks, located in Arizona’s Coconino National Forest, are consi-
dered one of the most revered mountains by the Hopi and Navajo reli-
gious cultures.137  To the Hopi, “the Peaks are the home of the Kachinas, 
spiritual beings who assist the Creator as his emissaries to humanity.”138  
The Peaks are an essential element of many religious ceremonies, includ-
ing annual pilgrimages by Hopi elders and other tribal members.139  The 
Kachina Peaks are the most sacred place for the Hopi, serving as both a 
destination for major pilgrimages and the residence of Hopi gods.140 
To the Navajos, the Peaks are one of four mountains marking the 
boundaries of the Dinetah, the sacred Navajo homeland.141  The Navajo 
people have always had “a spiritual obligation to stay within their ho-
                                                 
 136. Id. at 452–53.  The Court emphasized that the First Amendment must apply to all citizens 
alike, stating “it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free 
exercise of religion.”  Id. at 452. 
 137. BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED LAND 61 (1999).  The Peaks are not only held sacred by the 
Hopi and the Navajo, but also the Havasupai Tribe, the Yavapai-Apache Nation, the Hualapai Tribe, 
and others.  See also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 138. BROWN, supra note 137, at 61. 
 139. Id. at 61–62. 
 140. Id.  Brown states: 
For some six months of the year, the Kachinas travel to the Hopi villages and participate 
with the tribe in the various religious ceremonies and rituals referred to as the Kachina 
cycle.  Then, beginning in late July or early August and extending through mid-winter, 
the Kachinas return to the Peaks for the next six months and take up residence.  The Hopi 
people believe that the Kachinas’ activities on the peaks give rise to the rain and snow 
storms that nurture the villages with life-sustaining water and food and thus, their happi-
ness, health and well-being.  No other place is more sacred than the Kachina Peaks, 
which is the object of annual pilgrimages by Hopi elders and other tribal members who 
deposit prayer offerings of eagle feathers, turquoise, and other ritual objects at innumera-
ble sites. 
Id. 
 141. Id. at 62.  See also Carpenter, supra note 75. 
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meland, care for it, and revere their sacred mountains.”142  The Peaks are 
especially “revered as the physical embodiment of one of the Holy Ones 
or Navajo gods, with various parts forming the head, shoulders, and 
knees of a body reclining and facing to the east, and the trees, plants, 
rocks, and earth making up the skin.”143  “The Navajos pray to the peaks 
as a living, sacred being to whom they are intimately related.”144  The 
Peaks connect Navajos to their origins as a people and “reflect sacred 
histories, both ancient and modern.”145 
As a result of the Peaks’ importance, many claims have been 
brought over the years alleging interference with religious freedom.  The 
first of these decisions, Wilson v. Block,146 set the stage for what would 
become decades of litigation over use of the Peaks, ultimately culminat-
ing in Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service. 
1.  Wilson v. Block 
In 1937, a 777-acre portion of the San Francisco Peaks, designated 
the Arizona Snowbowl, was set aside for recreational skiing and the con-
struction of a ski lodge.147  The original lodge was destroyed by fire in 
1952 and in 1956 a new lodge was constructed.148  In 1958, a Poma lift 
was installed, as was a chairlift in 1962.149  The following fifteen years 
saw very little change in the facilities.150 
In April 1977, the U.S. Forest Service transferred the permit to op-
erate the Snowbowl skiing facility from Summit Properties, Inc., to the 
Northland Recreation Company.151  In July 1977, Northland submitted to 
the Forest Service a “master plan” for the future development of the 
Snowbowl, which included the construction of additional parking, new 
                                                 
 142. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 352. 
 143. BROWN, supra note 137, at 62. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Carpenter, supra note 75, at 353.  For example, according to the Navajo creation story, the 
Peaks were the home of the first woman, Changing Woman.  Changing Woman, the mother of twins 
who are the ancestors of the Navajo people, experienced her kinaalda coming-of-age ceremony on 
the Peaks, and young Navajo women continue to celebrate their own kinaalda ceremonies today.  Id., 
see also Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).  An example of a modern societal 
history is the “Long Walk,” the federal government’s forceful relocation of the Navajos from their 
homeland to a prison camp at Bosque Redondo.  Carpenter, supra note 75, at 353.  This period, from 
1864 to 1868, was a defining time in Navajo history; it signified a desire and longing to return to the 
homeland, marked by the San Francisco Peaks.  Id. 
 146. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 147. Id. at 738. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1030. 
 150. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 738. 
 151. Id. 
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lodges, expanded ski slopes, and more ski lifts.152  Pursuant to the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, the Forest Service identified six feasi-
ble plans that represented the spectrum of public opinion.153  Between 
June 23 and September 30, 1978, the Forest Service solicited public opi-
nion on a draft Environmental Impact Statement based on the six plans 
and made special efforts to solicit views from the Hopis and the Nava-
jos.154  On February 27, 1979, the Forest Service issued a decision to 
permit moderate development of the Snowbowl.155 
Due to the sacredness and the prominence of the Peaks, the Navajo 
Medicinemen’s Association, the Hopi tribe, and nearby ranch owners 
filed several claims, including one under the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment in 1981.156  The plaintiffs sought to “halt . . . further 
development of the [Snowbowl] and the removal of existing ski facili-
ties.”157  The Navajo and the Hopi felt “that development of the Peaks 
would be a profane act and an affront to the deities, and as a result, the 
Peaks would lose their healing power and otherwise cease to benefit the 
tribes.”158 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court 
and concluded that the government had not unconstitutionally burdened 
the tribes’ religious practices or beliefs.159  The court also held that 
“plaintiffs seeking to restrict government land use in the name of reli-
gious freedom must, at a minimum, demonstrate that the government’s 
proposed land use would impair a religious practice that could not be 
performed at any other site.”160  Although the plaintiffs established the 
general indispensability of the Peaks to the practice of their religion, they 
                                                 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  These alternatives ranged from complete elimination of artificial structures in the 
Snowbowl to full development as proposed by Northland.  Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 739.  The plan selected was not one of the six alternatives previously presented.  
The plan allowed the clearing of 50 acres of forest for new ski runs, instead of the 120 acres re-
quested by Northland.  The plan also authorized construction of a new day lodge, improvement of 
restroom facilities, reconstruction of existing chair lifts, construction of three new lifts, and the pav-
ing and widening of the Snowbowl road.  Id. 
 156. Id.  Other claims were brought under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, the 
Establishment Clause, the Endangered Species Act, the Wilderness Act, the National Historic Pre-
servation Act, and 16 U.S.C. §§ 497, 551.  The district court granted the defendant’s summary 
judgment on all claims except the claim brought under the National Historic Preservation Act. 
 157. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 739. 
 158. Id. at 740.  “As relief, the Navajos and Hopis sought a phased removal of all artificial 
structures on the Peaks, or, at the least, an injunction against further development of the Snow 
Bowl.”  Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 744.  The court clarified that such proof would not necessarily establish a burden of 
free exercise, but that the First Amendment, at a minimum, required such proof.  Id. at 744 n.5. 
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failed to show the particular indispensability of the Snowbowl area.161  
Further, the Forest Service did not deny the plaintiffs access to the Peaks, 
but rather permitted free entry onto the Peaks and did not interfere with 
their ceremonies or the collection of ceremonial objects. 162  Therefore, 
the court determined that the plaintiffs had not proven that expansion of 
the ski area would prevent them from performing ceremonies or obtain-
ing ceremonial objects unique to the Snowbowl area.163 
2.  Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service 
In the years following the Wilson decision, many of the improve-
ments authorized by the Forest Service were implemented.164  In 2002, 
the current owners of the Snowbowl, Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited 
Partnership, submitted a proposal to implement snowmaking at the facili-
ty using “A+ reclaimed water,” which is treated sewage effluent.165  In 
February 2005, the Forest Supervisor issued a Final Environmental Im-
pact Statement and Record of Decision.166  Shortly thereafter, the plain-
tiffs commenced litigation alleging that the Forest Service had failed to 
comply with the requirements of the RFRA.167 
Noting that the ski area constituted only about one percent of the 
Peaks’ 74,000 acres of public land and that the area proposed for snow-
making was only approximately one quarter of one percent of the Peaks, 
the district court found that the Snowbowl upgrades did not interfere 
with or inhibit any of the plaintiffs’ religious practices.168  Although the 
court found that the Peaks were sacred to the plaintiff tribes, and crucial 
to their way of life, it found that the evidence “adduced at trial demon-
                                                 
 161. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 744. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (D. Ariz. 2006), rev’d, 479 
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
2763 (2009). 
 165. Id.  A+ reclaimed water “is the highest grade of reclaimed water recognized under Arizo-
na statutes and regulations.  Class A+ reclaimed water has been approved for use in snowmaking by 
the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality.”  Id. at 887. 
 166. The Record of Decision approved, in part: (a) approximately 205 acres of snowmaking 
coverage throughout the area, utilizing reclaimed water; (b) a 10 million-gallon reclaimed water 
reservoir near the top terminal of the existing chairlift and catchments pond below Hart Prairie 
Lodge; (c) construction of a reclaimed water pipeline between Flagstaff and the Snowbowl with 
booster stations and pump houses; (d) construction of a 3,000 to 4,000 square foot snowmaking 
control building; (e) construction of a new 10,000 square foot guest services facility; (f) an increase 
in skiable acreage from 139 to 205 acres—an approximate 47% increase; and (g) approximately 47 
acres of thinning and 87 acres of grading, stumping, and smoothing.  Id. at 871. 
 167. Id.  The plaintiffs also brought claims under NEPA, NHPA, ESA, the Grand Canyon 
National Park Enlargement Act, the National Forest Management Act, and trust law (that the Forest 
Service failed to comply with its responsibilities to the tribes).  Id. 
 168. Id. at 883, 886, 889. 
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strates that snowmaking is needed to maintain the viability of the Snow-
bowl as a public recreational resource.”169  Further, the area proposed for 
snowmaking was a marginal percentage of the Peaks and the tribes had 
already been using reclaimed water for various purposes.170 
In assessing whether a substantial burden was imposed on the Na-
tive American exercise of religion, the court found that the plaintiffs had 
“failed to present any objective evidence that their exercise of religion 
[would] be impacted by the Snowbowl upgrades.”171  Instead of looking 
at the effect on the land as a whole, the court focused on whether specific 
areas or ceremonies would be impacted.172  The court further found that 
the plaintiffs had neither met the “coercion” requirement of pre-Smith 
case law, nor had they demonstrated that their religious activity had been 
penalized.173  Therefore, as a matter of law, the district court held that the 
Forest Service’s authorization of upgrades to the ski area was not a viola-
tion of the RFRA.174  The plaintiffs appealed. 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court in part, holding that the use of recycled wastewater on the 
Snowbowl violates the RFRA.175  The court found two substantial bur-
dens for the Navajo and the Hopi plaintiffs.176  The first burden was “the 
inability to perform a particular religious ceremony, because the ceremo-
ny requires collecting natural resources from the Peaks that would be too 
contaminated—physically, spiritually, or both—for sacramental use.”177  
                                                 
 169. Id. at 907.  This finding affirms the Forest Service’s determination that improvements to 
Snowbowl would enable the ski area to provide a safe, reliable, and consistent operating season.  Id.  
The court recognized that both the protection of public safety and management of public land for 
recreational uses are compelling governmental interests.  Id. at 906. 
 170. Id. at 898.  Reclaimed water was used by many of the plaintiff tribes for irrigation, dust 
control, and soil compacting.  Id.  In addition, waste from reservation medical clinics was disposed 
of on what was considered Navajo sacred land.  Id. 
 171. Id. at 905 (finding that “[t]he subjective views and beliefs presented at trial, although 
sincerely held, are not sufficient for the proposed project to constitute a substantial burden under 
RFRA on the practice of religion by any Plaintiff or any members of any Plaintiff tribe or nation.”).  
Id. 
 172. The court explained that the plaintiffs did not identify any plants, springs, or natural re-
sources, or any shrines or religious ceremonies that would be affected by the Snowbowl upgrades.  
Id. 
 173. Id. at 905.  “The Legislature intended for courts to look to pre-Smith cases when applying 
RFRA and thus the court’s finding of no coercion was tantamount to its holding that there was no 
substantial burden here.”  S. REP. NO. 103-111 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 
1989; see also Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1988); Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 174 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 870 (D. Ariz. 2006). 
 175. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 
535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). 
 176. Id. at 1043.  The court did not need to decide whether there was a substantial burden on 
the other tribes because it found one for the Navajo and the Hopi.  Id. at 1034. 
 177. Id. at 1039. 
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The second burden was “the inability to maintain daily and annual reli-
gious practices comprising an entire way of life, because the practices 
required belief in the mountain’s purity or a spiritual connection to the 
mountain that would be undermined by the contamination.”178 
Unlike the district court, which held that the tribes had not pre-
sented any objective evidence of a substantial burden, the Ninth Circuit 
went into great detail to describe the religious practices of the involved 
tribes, emphasizing the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs.179 In particular, the 
court highlighted the belief that the mountains are a living being, and 
contamination of one portion would contaminate the whole.180 
Finding a substantial burden, the court proceeded to the remaining 
steps of the RFRA’s compelling interest test.181  The court rejected the 
argument that the Snowbowl upgrades were in furtherance of a compel-
ling governmental interest achieved by the least restrictive means be-
cause it was unwilling to hold that “authorizing the use of artificial snow 
at an already functioning commercial ski area in order to expand and im-
prove its facilities . . . is a governmental interest ‘of the highest or-
der.’”182  The tribes’ interest in sustaining their religious identity had 
been validated.  The victory, however, was short-lived. 
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit took the case en banc to revisit the pan-
el’s decision and to clarify the court’s interpretation of substantial burden 
under the RFRA.183  The court reversed the panel’s decision and affirmed 
the district court’s denial of relief.184  Emphasizing the preeminence of 
pre-Smith decisions, the court held that under the RFRA, a substantial 
burden is imposed only where individuals are forced to choose between 
following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental bene-
fit (e.g., Sherbert) or are coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs 
by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions (e.g., Yoder).”185  If a burden 
imposed falls short of the situations described in Sherbert and Yoder, it is 
not a substantial burden and therefore does not require application of the 
compelling interest test.186  Because neither situation applies in Navajo 
                                                 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1039–42. 
 180. Id. at 1034–38.  It is important to note that the panel did not address the lower court’s 
finding that waste water was already being disposed of on the Navajo reservation.  See supra text 
accompanying note 170. 
 181. See Navajo Nation, 479 F.3d at 1033–34. 
 182. Id. at 1044. 
 183. Id. at 1067. 
 184. Id. at 1063. 
 185. Id. at 1070. 
 186. Id.  The dissent emphasized, however, that Congress intended courts to apply the compel-
ling interest test to all RFRA cases.  Instead of seeing Sherbert and Yoder as definitive examples of 
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Nation, the court determined that the compelling interest test was erro-
neously applied.187 
The court found that the “only effect of the proposed upgrades is on 
the [p]laintiffs’ subjective, emotional religious experience. . . .  [I]t will 
spiritually desecrate a sacred mountain and will decrease the spiritual 
fulfillment they get from practicing their religion on that mountain.”188  
The court further noted that “for all the rich complexity that describes the 
profound integration of man and mountain into one, the burden of the 
recycled wastewater can only be expressed by the [p]laintiffs as damaged 
spiritual feelings.  Under Supreme Court precedent, government action 
that diminishes subjective spiritual fulfillment does not ‘substantially 
burden’ religion.”189  As the en banc court noted, the undue burden in 
Yoder was not the effect of secular education on children’s subjective 
religious sensibilities, but rather the penalty of criminal sanctions for 
parents refusing to enroll their children in secular school.190  Further, the 
court emphasized that in Sherbert, the protected interest was the receipt 
of unemployment benefits and not the right to take a religious rest on 
Saturday.191  However, the dissent fervently objected to the majority’s 
interpretation of substantial burden, listing multiple reasons why the ma-
jority was wrong in considering Sherbert and Yoder.192 
First, the dissent criticized the majority’s approach as inconsistent 
with the plain language meaning of substantial burden.193  Second, the 
dissent stated that the RFRA does not incorporate any pre-RFRA defini-
tion of substantial burden.194  Even if it did, the dissent argued, the cases 
on which the majority relies “did not state that interferences with the ex-
ercise of religion constituted a ‘substantial burden’ only when imposed 
                                                                                                             
when the compelling interest applies, the dissent views them as illustrative examples.  Id. at 1089 
(Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
 187. Id. at 1070. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1070 n.12. 
 190. Id.; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (“The impact of the compulsory-
attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for 
the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under the threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts 
undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs.”). 
 191. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070 n.12; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963) 
(“This holding . . . reaffirms a principle that . . . no State may exclude . . . the members of any . . . 
faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 192. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1086 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id.  According to the dissent, substantial burden has a plain and ordinary meaning that 
“does not depend on the presence of a penalty or deprivation of benefit.”  Id. 
 194. Id. 
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through the two mechanisms used in Sherbert and Yoder.”195  Further, 
the RFRA was designed to expand rather than contract protection for 
religious exercise; it creates a legally protected interest in the exercise of 
religion.196,197 
Debate lingers regarding exactly what substantial burden means.  
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has already applied the precedent it set in 
Navajo Nation. 
3.  Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
Just a few months after the Ninth Circuit’s final opinion in Navajo 
Nation, the court’s narrow reading of the substantial burden test affected 
another sacred site case.  In Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, the Ninth Circuit again applied the require-
ments of Sherbert and Yoder and held that the Snoqualmie tribe had 
failed to demonstrate a substantial burden that would meet the Navajo 
Nation standard.198 
The subject of the case was the Snoqualmie Falls, a site sacred to 
the Snoqualmie tribe.  The Falls play a central role in the tribe’s creation 
story and are an important location for its religious practices.199  The 
tribe performs religious ceremonies at the Falls, including vision 
quests—“multi-day events in which individual tribal members seek spiri-
tual contact through meditation, fasting, and bathing in the water below 
the Falls.”200 
The dispute arose after Puget Sound Energy, Inc. (PSE) was 
granted a license to continue operation of the Snoqualmie Falls Hydroe-
                                                 
 195. Id. (emphasis added) (highlighting that the RFRA does not state a particular mechanism 
by which religion cannot be burdened, but rather a prohibition on government action that has a par-
ticular effect on religious exercise). 
 196. Id. at 1090.  The dissent also emphasized that the majority’s approach overrules fourteen 
years of contrary circuit precedent and that it is inconsistent with cases applying the RLUIPA.  Id. at 
1086. 
 197. On January 5, 2009, the Navajo, the Hopi, and other tribes petitioned the U.S. Supreme 
Court for a writ of certiorari.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No. 
08-846), 2009 WL 46999.  A handful of amici filed briefs in support of the petition.  See, e.g., Brief 
of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. in Support of the Petitioners, Navajo 
Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No. 08-846), 2009 WL 355746; Brief of Amici Curiae Religious Liberty 
Law Scholars in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certriorari, Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (No. 
08-846), 2009 WL 355748.  Only time will tell if the conservative Ninth Circuit test will be applied 
nationwide. 
 198. Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 199. Id. at 1211.  The tribe believes that the mist generated by the Falls connects the earth to 
the heavens and that a power water spirit lives in the plunge pool below the Falls.  Id. 
 200. Id. 
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lectric Project, which began in 1975.201  The project consists of “a low-
level diversion dam located upstream from the Falls, an underground 
power plant, and an above-ground power plant downstream from the 
Falls.”202  The tribe argued that the continued operation of the hydroelec-
tric project prevented it from having necessary religious experiences in 
three ways: the project’s operation deprived the tribe of access to the 
Falls for vision quests and other religious experiences, it eliminated the 
mist necessary for the tribe’s religious experiences, and it altered the an-
cient sacred cycle of water flowing over the Falls.”203  However, the ar-
gument failed when the court applied the Navajo Nation test.  Because 
the tribal members would not lose a government benefit or face criminal 
or civil sanctions for practicing their religion, the governmental activity 
did not impose a substantial burden on the tribal members’ ability to ex-
ercise religion.204  Thus, due to the overly restrictive compelling interest 
test from Navajo Nation, another Native American tribe has lost full en-
joyment of its traditional religion, endangering the tribe’s general well-
being and peoplehood. 
VI.  THE BIOPOLITICAL EFFECT OF THE NAVAJO NATION TEST 
The overly restrictive compelling interest test from Navajo Nation 
should be reconsidered because of the biopolitical effect it has on Native 
American populations.  Although biopolitics can, at times, lead to a liter-
al taking of life, it can have a more insidious effect on native culture.  
Because native identity, both collectively and individually, is so closely 
related to land itself, decisions affecting the maintenance and control of 
the land affect the survival of the tribes themselves.  From the native 
perspective, pollution of religious sites will inevitably wipe out the tri-
bes.  Because the Navajo Nation decision allows Native American sacred 
sites to be polluted, if it continues to stand it may destroy the very exis-
tence of the tribes. 
Although the en banc court of appeals did not doubt the sincerity of 
the tribes’ deeply held religious beliefs,205 it failed to understand that 
“damaged spiritual feelings”206 are more than just a subjective religious 
experience in the Native American context; damage to spirituality literal-
ly threatens the existence of a tribe.  In failing to understand that connec-
                                                 
 201. Id. at 1210. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1213. 
 204. Id. at 1214. 
 205. Cf.  Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009) (discussing at length the plaintiffs’ “subjective, emotional religious expe-
rience”). 
 206. Id. 
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tion, the court declined to assign it the proper weight.  Greater weight 
should be assigned because the character of native religion is inherently 
different from the Western-based religions on which the RFRA 
precedent is founded.207  Because of crucial differences between Western 
and Native American religions, specifically the importance of place, this 
precedent is insufficient for an adequate RFRA sacred site test. 
Difficult legal and regulatory decisions must inevitably be made, 
and one group or another will mostly likely be displeased with the result.  
Foucault’s philosophies are helpful because they provide a novel way of 
seeing how such decisions affect a population.  His concept of biopower 
is applicable in the Native American context because, as Kristen Carpen-
ter’s research shows,208 Indian peoplehood is affected by adverse deci-
sions in sacred site cases.  Here, by “making live” the expansion of the 
Snowbowl resort and the corresponding recreation, the en banc court of 
appeals in Navajo Nation is essentially “letting die” the affected tribal 
populations. 
The test developed from Navajo Nation should be reconsidered be-
cause of this biopolitical effect on Native American populations and a 
new test that takes into consideration the unique character of the link be-
tween native religion and land should be implemented. 
                                                 
 207. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 208. See Carpenter, supra note 75. 
